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Fighting to Lose: How the German Secret Intelligence Service Helped
the Allies Win the Second World War. John Bryden. Toronto:
Dundurn Press, 2014. Pp. 415.
The last fifteen years have seen a resurgence of literature on Second
World War intelligence activities from both the Allied and Axis sides.
The release of previously classified government documents from
the war and its surrounding years have opened the doors for new
debate and perspectives on the role of intelligence activities during
the Second World War. With the release of these documents, new
insights can be gained and new assessments made connecting secret
intelligence activities between nations at war previously unseen.
John Bryden’s nineteen-chapter book Fighting to Lose: How the
German Secret Intelligence Service Helped the Allies Win the Second
World War seeks to provide evidence that the Abwehr purposefully
provided intelligence to the Allies through a series of double and
triple-agents in hopes of bringing the United States into the war as
Britain’s saviour.
Bryden’s examination of Second World War secret intelligence
organizations highlights a connection between the Abwehr, German
Secret Intelligence, and Allied intelligence agencies, mi 5 in Britain and
the FBI in the United States. Based on incomplete archival evidence,
Bryden infers that Admiral Canaris, head of the German Abwehr,
purposefully planted agents for the British to exploit. His intention
was to inform the British about Hitler’s invasion of Czechoslovakia,
Operation Barbarossa, and the ultimate attack on Pearl Harbor that
moved the United States to enter the war (p. 12). What mi 5 did with
this information is a point of contention for Bryden and one which he
dwells on frequently while building his argument.
Bryden provides a note to the reader at the beginning of the
book in hopes of making the reading experience easier by offering
some historical context before moving to the introduction. The
three-page introduction outlines the inspiration of this project as Ian
Colvin’s 1951 book Chief of Intelligence that offers the first mention
of Admiral Canaris as a “British agent” during the Second World
War (p. 12). Where Colvin relied on word of mouth and hearsay to
develop his book, Bryden jumped into the official records released in
the 1990s and the numerous books subsequently released books to
find evidence of the idea that Canaris exercised anti-Nazi sentiments
by providing Allied intelligence agencies with crucial elements of
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information, namely the attack on Pearl Harbor, which brought the
United States into the Second World War.
Bryden uses a chronological sequence of events to provide a
backdrop on which to build his theory. He begins by providing a
detailed synopsis of the state of secret intelligence agencies in Germany,
Britain, and the United States leading into the war. The disparity
between German and Allied intelligence agency preparation leading
into the war is quite large. Admiral Canaris conducted research and
developed methods to ensure the viability of the Abwehr in what
would turn into the Second World War. By implementing guidance
from his predecessor and mentor Colonel Walter Nicolai, Canaris
created an intelligence organization capable of providing intelligence
on military, diplomatic, and economic to German leadership as
codified in Nicolai’s “espionage ‘bible’” The German Secret Service
(London, 1924), which was first published in English and largely
ignored by mi 5 (p. 52). This theme of British inadequacy continues
from the prologue to the conclusion, with numerous examples of
outdated methods and thinking in the upper-echelons of British
intelligence services (p. 59).
The author loosely connects Canaris directly to the various
double agents discussed throughout the book. However, he clearly
describes how the Abwehr informed mi 5 of planned operations. Not
all the information was acted upon by British intelligence, based on
their belief that Germany was sub-par when it came to intelligence
gathering. One of only a few mentions of Canaris’ direct involvement
in the schemes of supplying information to mi 5 comes from the
perspective of one of the “double-agents” employed in the beginning
of 1941 that met with Stewart Menzies, mi 6 Chief (p. 174). Most
connections with Canaris made throughout the book are two or
three times removed. This leads one to think that, perhaps it was
not Canaris that directed information be passed to Britain, but a
subordinate that shared similar anti-Nazi views and Canaris simply
allowed the actions.
Bryden clearly defines his aim and argument at the beginning
of the book. However, the first half of the text covers the ineptitude
of mi 5 and mi 6 more than the supposed connection between Canaris
and Allied intelligence. Not until the later chapters of the book does
the argument come to fruition. Chapter 15 provides a timeline of
events leading up to Pearl Harbor and the mishandling of intelligence
that implied a pending attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese.
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Bryden finally makes a solid accounting of how the Abwehr provides
sound information to both Britain and the United States encouraging
them to prepare for attack in the Pacific based on a questionnaire
supplied to one of the German triple-agents, Dusko Popov (p. 216).
Until the final chapters, much of the preceding information
leads one to believe the book seeks to explain that mi 5 and mi 6
were inept at running an effective intelligence organization. Then
one realizes that, chapter-by-chapter, Bryden builds his argument by
incrementally covering the Second World War up to the entrance of
the United States after Pearl Harbor. Each chapter covers a specified
time period ranging from a few months to a few years. Bryden
develops his argument using both primary documents and secondary
sources from those directly involved with the “double-cross system”
and the xx Committee. He draws his conclusions from the gaps in
primary documentation and connects events, in some cases, with no
direct support (p. 179).
John Bryden’s background as politician, journalist, and
accomplished military historian make this book a relatively easy read.
The layman with little knowledge of the inner workings of intelligence
agencies, specifically those of the mid-twentieth century, will find
Bryden’s style of writing easy to comprehend. He clearly outlines
the structures of each intelligence service and provides background
information on the efficacy of each organization. On the other hand,
he often switches between codename, case number, and name when
he refers to the many double agents throughout the book.
I would recommend this book to any person interested in the
history of intelligence and espionage. It provides a unique lens from
which to view secret intelligence activities during the Second World
War and is easily digestible for an undergraduate student. This
book would also be a beneficial read for professional intelligence
personnel dealing in human intelligence and espionage. Bryden
succinctly outlines the connections one must make between tidbits
of information to create a larger understanding of events. He also
provides the aspiring intelligence historian with a historiography of
sorts for the study of Second World War espionage that would give
any historian a head start on research. Fighting to Lose is worth the
read if for nothing more than an enjoyable experience.
joshua mccarty
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